Bolivia's "Evismo": "specters" of communism or "ghosts" of neoliberalism?

Javier Sanjinés C.

Elected president of Bolivia on December 18, 2005, and reelected in December 2009 with a historic 64% of the popular vote, Evo Morales, of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), is the first indigenous president in the republic's history. Morales's MAS is also associated to the "pink tide" of leftist governments that is sweeping Latin America through the ballot box. How should we interpret this stunning victory, and what is its significance for revolutionary or reformist change in one of the most backward and poorest countries of Latin America?

Following Jeffrey Webber's *From rebellion to reform in Bolivia*, an illuminating book on class struggle, indig-

enous liberation, and the policies of Evo Morales (2011), I will argue in this paper that Morales's opportunity to move forward with a more direct confrontation with the logic of capital, is more rhetorical than real. Likewise, the Morales government has incorporated some of the language of indigenous liberation developed by the earlier stages of popular struggle during the first years of this century, but has separated its indigenous focus from the material reality facing indigenous people.

While the current conjuncture at the close of Morales's second term attests to the fact that his government has reconstituted neoliberalism, it also leaves little doubt that on both the right and the left internationally, hyperbole has often substituted for deeper reflection and analysis of the Bolivian scenario. Recently, Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala give, in chapter four of their interesting *Hermeneutic communism. From Heidegger to Marx* (2011), uncritical support to the Morales government. In so doing, the authors have not taken into account how Morales's policies have deviated from the popular struggles for socialist and indigenous decolonizing emancipation.

Hermeneutic communism must be commended for its reformulations of political philosophy, reaching from ontological premises to political philosophy. According to the authors, hermeneutic communism "is not the outcome of a theoretical discovery or a logical correction of previous errors but rather the result of the end of metaphysics" (2011, p. 110). Vattimo and Zabala indicate that "hermeneutics could not have been possible without the end of Eurocen-

trism, which has also always been the sociopolitical correlative of Western metaphysics" (p. 110). Since they call for the end of metaphysics and a change to the return of communism, they do so "in the name of justice, fraternity, and the solidarity of the weak" (p. 111). Just as Vattimo rightly condemns the recent bloodbath perpetrated by Israeli military forces in Palestine, the author of *Hermeneutic communism* also points to the various crises that led to the dissolution of metaphysics in the twentieth century, accompanied not only by wars but also by the technological revolutions unimaginable in the past.

Hermeneutic communism affirms the "historical (not theoretical) necessity to recapture communism in the moment in which its "spectrality" seems to have reached its peak" (p. 112). For Vattimo and Zabala, the recourse to spectral communism becomes an objective necessary today because of the discharge of capitalism and also because it continues to impose itself as the ideal of human history. In order to find alternative models of capitalism and alternatives to its historical manifestation in neoliberal policies, both authors affirm that some of the domestically elected governments of South America could become possible models for the West to pursue (p. 113). Consequently, Evo Morales's democratically elected government could be considered an example of the communist promise of a society without classes, which in turn "could be interpreted as 'without dominion', that is without an imposed unique truth and compulsory orthodoxy" (p. 117). This could also be called a "society of dialogue", presenting the features

that constitute the "spectrality" that is the indispensable characteristic of the rebirth of communism. "Evismo", the name given to the governmental expansion of indigenous cultural rights in Bolivia, could be considered as a South American alternative to capitalism, and the emblematic sign that "reformism" has come to an end. As I said before, although *Hermeneutic communism* must be commended for its ontological reinterpretation of revolutionary action, it exaggerates the radicalism of Morales's social and economic policies, and promotes a dominant international view of Morales's development project in Bolivia, a view steeped in romanticization. Predictably, the debates occurring inside the country, and analyzed comprehensively in Webber's *From rebellion to reform in Bolivia*, allow me to present five themes that cut against the grain of the fashionable left-wing interpretation of Evo Morales and the Bolivian process. The purpose here is to document the extent to which neoliberalism still shapes Morales's social and economic policies.

First, the plausible interpretation of the left-indigenous insurrectionary period between 2000 and 2005 as a "revolutionary epoch". However radical, this period could not produce a true social revolution; as popular forces shifted to the electoral arena, "Evismo" could be considered a regressive movement because it turned popular politics into a rebellion that reverted to reform (Webber, 2011, p. 43-9).

The insurrectionary period between 2000 and 2005 met the criteria of a "revolutionary epoch", and constituted the "weakness and spectrality that are the indispensa-

ble characteristic for communism's rebirth" (Vattimo and Zabala, 2011, p. 117). This insurrectionary period sent out important signs that reformism had come to an end, and that reactionary forces were no longer capable of winning ground. Indeed, during this five-year cycle of urban and rural revolt, sustained mass mobilization from below and a multifaceted state crisis from above created opportunities for a transformative structural change to the Bolivian state and society.

As Webber points out, the insurrectionary cycle had the sturdy support of a plethora of movements that radically questioned the existing neoliberal armed order. These mass movements were engaged in a combined liberating struggle to overcome the interrelated processes of class exploitation and racial oppression of the indigenous majority. The guiding aspects of this wave of radicalism and "spectral" communism were the nationalization of, and social control over, natural resources such as water, natural gas and oil, ores, land and indigenous territory. Popular organizations and movements revived the "weak messianic power" of the historic fight to refound Bolivia through a revolutionary Constituent Assembly that would see the organized participation of the popular sectors. This would reverse the centuries-long internal colonial domination of the white-*mestizo* elite over the majority indigenous population, a system of oppression petrified in state institutions at the founding of the republic in 1825 and still haunting Bolivia's present as an unsolved 'ghostly" situation, even after the reforms carried out by the 1952 nationalist-populist revolution.

Bringing the unsolved problems of the past into the present, the indigenous movements were rooted in the everyday necessities of the popular classes, while at the same time, at moments of mass mobilization they effectively associated these issues with the quest for political power and the structural transformation of the state and economy.

Absent from the scene was a revolutionary party capable of uniting the multiplicity of emerging popular forces. The MAS, led by *cocalero* union leader Evo Morales, was the only force able to organize the masses beyond the local or regional terrain. While Evo Morales's political force played an important part in the Water War of 2000, it opted later on for constitutional solutions to the state crisis, and in 2005 steered the political conjuncture away from the radicalism of the streets toward the sphere of traditional politics. Signs of a tamer leftist reformism, aligning the MAS with bourgeois, moderate forces, could be detected as early as 2002, when Morales distanced his movement from massive popular rebellion and turned toward electoral politics as the definitive domain of party praxis. The MAS started to court the urban middle-class voters in electoral contests, a clear indication that it did not envisage a profound rupture with the nation-state under neoliberalism. Two clear moments of this shifting reformist constitutionalism were the December 2005 national elections and the Constituent Assembly of 2006.

The 2005 elections sliced the country into east and west; while the MAS won in the Andean departments of La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Cochabamba, and Chuquisaca, PODEMOS

("we can"), the neoliberal coalition, captured the Amazonian departments of Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz, as well as Tarija. As the country was politically split between reformists and revolutionaries, the MAS had, as was expected, its best results in the countryside. But it also took the cities. Appealing to the informal urban proletariat, the MAS was able to win in all cities, except in the reactionary heartland of Santa Cruz. The MAS vice-presidential candidate Álvaro García Linera was instrumental in this electoral win. A suave and well-educated mathematician and ideologue of the *Cochabambino* middle class, García Linera was successful in steering the MAS towards a moderate electoral platform. His reformist political and economic views—he is the architect of an "Andean-Amazonian capitalism"—helped the MAS win over sufficient middle- and upper-class urban voters in the wealthy neighborhoods of La Paz and Cochabamba to secure victory. As Webber observes, analysts have pointed out that the middle and upper classes perceived the reformist MAS's realistic strategies as a potential antidote to the left-indigenous insurrections of the preceding five years. A potential win of the far-right PODEMOS was perceived by the elites as suicidal because it would assuredly result in a rebirth of violence and revolutionary unrest. In other words, the Bolivian upper and middle classes saw in Evo Morales's electoral victory a smooth, veiled reproduction of the capitalist system. PODEMOS, the open neoliberal coalition, would have been too risky a solution, given the tumultuous five previous years. As a consequence, the 2005 elections were steering Bolivia back into reform.

The Constituent Assembly of 2006 confirmed the transformation of the insurrectionary popular drive into a tamer "social pact" with right-wing forces inside and outside of Congress. While the popular social movements demanded a revolutionary Constituent Assembly that would drastically modify the economy, state, and society seeking to improve the lives of so many of the "weak", the Constituent Assembly introduced by the MAS in 2006 rejected all such revolutionary and participatory proposals. Instead, it went back to the traditionally constituted politics of the Congress, making every effort to appease the landholding bourgeoisie of the eastern part of the country—the so-called "*media luna* states"—in regard to the definition of the Assembly's rules and procedures. This, in turn, paved the way for the rearticulation of the right-wing forces. The room afforded to them by the MAS in the Constituent Assembly helped to reconstitute a political project in the form of right-wing "autonomism" in the departments of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz and Tarija, the four *media luna* states.

The whole set-up of the Constituent Assembly was indeed contradictory. If regional self-determination is a pillar of democracy, the regional autonomy demanded by the *media luna* states meant handing over Bolivia's wealth to the most reactionary and wealthy of the Bolivian ruling class, as well as to transnational corporations. Webber notes that the distorted 2006 Constituent Assembly, geared back into reformism by the MAS political forces, shows that the "revolutionary epoch" did not lead to "so-

cial revolution". The concept of social revolution, while it still connotes process and uncertainty, allows measuring "the depths and consequences of lasting structural change that have successfully won through the popular struggle of a revolutionary epoch" (2011, p. 46). It is clear that the 2006 Constituent Assembly did not lead the country in the direction of social revolution.

Secondly, for *Hermeneutic communism* a society without classes and consequently capable of living in peace through dialogue constitutes the "weakness and spectrality that are the indispensable characteristic for communism's rebirth" (2011, p. 117). In the Bolivian case, the referendum held on January 25, 2009 and won with 69% of the vote, expressed this "spectrality" because supposedly it strengthened the rights of the country's indigenous peoples by increasing community involvement and enhancing the rights of the weakest segments of the population (2011, p. 127).

The origins of the MAS, as well as the party's class composition, confirm Vattimo and Zabala's observations on the rebirth of communism. The historic roots of the MAS lie in the coca-growing zone of Chapare, in the department of Cochabamba. With the crash of the international price of tin and the corresponding privatization of most of the state mining industry in the mid-1980s, tens of thousands of jobless miners were "relocated" throughout the country, thus constituting the "weak and spectral" social component of a once-proud working force. The relocated miners had to adapt to a coalition of social forces in the volatile, semitropical region of Chapare, where Trotskyite

ideas and organizational strategies brought to the area by the migrant miners melded with the visions and tactics of the preexisting networks of indigenous and peasant union and community structures. Through hunger strikes, road blockades, and historic marches tracing long stretches of Bolivian countryside and cityscapes, both *cocalero* and indigenous forces constructed an interesting "culture of dialogue" among themselves, in this way showing the "spectrality" claimed by the authors of *Hermeneutic communism*. It remained to be seen if this "spectrality" would resist the ideological changes that the MAS encountered as it shifted in class composition over the following years.

Jeffrey Webber observes that the shift in the party's ideology toward moderate reformism happened as early as 2002. In conflict with the "weakness" and the "spectrality" expressed in *Hermeneutic communism*, the changes were not a consequence of a new outlook on the part of Morales himself, but rather the shift was "indicative of an alteration in strategic orientation toward electoral politics and the changing class composition of the party over time" (2011, p. 63).

While historians Forrest Hylton and Sinclair Thomson, writing in 2005, before the electoral victory of the MAS, argued that "The current cycle (…) constitutes the third major revolutionary moment in Bolivian history (2005, p. 63), the first being the anti-colonial indigenous rebellion led by Túpaj Katari in 1781, and the second being the 1952 National Revolution", the endgame of the revolutionary moment was still in play at the time the piece was writ-

ten. One year later, the character of the MAS cabinet in 2006 reflected the shifts in ideology and in class composition, far apart from the weak and spectral nature of subaltern movements. While many of the individuals selected to fill these positions came from popular upbringings (peasants, miners), they currently come from relatively privileged, middle-class sectors of the rural and urban economies. Furthermore, the moderately reformist nature of the MAS grew progressively evident when vice-president Álvaro García Linera became the dominant public voice of the MAS's new economic development program.

García Linera posited that Bolivia ought to first build an industrial capitalist base. The capitalist model he envisions—"Andean-Amazonian capitalism"—gives primacy to state intervention in the market. This means capitalist development with a stronger state to support a petty-bourgeoisie that will eventually become a national bourgeoisie of indigenous, or "Andean-Amazonian", origins. Only after a long intermediary phase of industrial capitalism would Bolivia "eventually" turn to communism. This process, described by Webber as a regression from revolution into reform, resembles the old line of the Stalinist Bolivian Communist Party.

García Linera's moderate reformism also allowed the autonomist right to partially consolidate itself. It distorted the revolutionary nature of the Constituent Assembly of 2006 envisioned by the indigenous movements between 2000 and 2005. García Linera was also instrumental in demobilizing autonomous rural and urban protests or in stra-

tegically mobilizing its bases against the *media luna* right-wing autonomous states, but within guidelines predetermined by the MAS elites. In fact, it could be argued that instead of revolutionary advances, what we see today is a new corporativist state—philosopher and political analyst Luis Tapia has recently referred to it as the "*criollo* Leviathan"—with a disciplined working class and a carefully engineered capitalist economy.

Thirdly, the disassociation from the project of socialist transformation is related to the fact that the MAS has artificially separated decolonization—the cultural and anticolonial revolution to end oppression of indigenous people—from the revolution to end class exploitation experienced by the same indigenous population. Issues organically linked to the 2000-2005 revolutionary epoch have begun to unravel in the rhetorical distortions adopted by the MAS in government. In this sense, decolonization has become purely rhetorical as the MAS progressively co-opted its symbols. Indeed, I have recently written the prologue to a book that unveils how indigenous representation has been shrewdly accommodated to the symbols of the apparently debunked liberal nation-state, maintaining the symbolic structures of the already constituted civic nation together with the constituting and decolonizing pluri-national state (Tórrez and Arce, 2014).

Furthermore, the MAS has decided ideologically to overcome the contradiction of simultaneously promoting democratic indigenous revolution and neoliberal continuities by separating the anticolonial indigenous revolution against racial oppression from the economic revolution to

end class exploitation. Webber indicates that during the insurrectionary period between 2000 and 2005, socialist movements believed that the racist oppression and class exploitation of the majority of indigenous workers and peasants were organically linked, and had to be debunked simultaneously in a coordinated liberation struggle. In reality, however, the MAS appropriated the decolonial rhetoric and advocated indigenous cultural revolution immediately, leaving socialist transformation as a mere possibility relegated to the distant future.

In this approach to transformative politics, the nature of decolonization was distorted by what Webber calls the "neostructuralist perspective", thus showing the weaknesses of decolonization when the fight against racial oppression is not accompanied by an equal effort to end class exploitation. In García Linera's conceptualization of the state, the class relations of capitalism and the repressive role of the state (hence the notion of the reborn Leviathan) in reproducing these relations are obscured, being replaced by a non-ideological, pragmatic set of institutions acting in the general interest of society. As we will see later on, the state disciplines labor as necessary, allowing capital to grow for further reinvestment and accumulation. Since capitalist competition is still the operative framework, the reborn Leviathan provides private investors with the institutions that supply a reserve of relatively cheap, flexible, and disciplined labor.

For ideologues of neostructuralism, like political analyst Pablo Stefanoni, the plurinational state's anti-imperi-

alism relies on previous nationalist movements. The new state surpasses them, however, because it does not rely on militarism or on the middle classes leading the project, but on indigenous and peasant sectors. Stefanoni, as well as other analysts who empathize with "Evismo", considers that the current process stems from popular nationalism and is a plebeian follow-up on the postrevolutionary 1950s, adding to it a novel indigenous nucleus. But what Stefanoni and others are confusing in their attempt to neutralize decolonization and render it obsolete (Stefanoni, 2010) is the rhetorical anti-imperialism promoting state-led industrialization with actual substantive movement toward that end. While there are similarities to the 1952 Revolution—and neostructuralists are correct in affirming that the MAS has recreated the legacy of nationalist populism in a new mélange of indigenous decolonization fit for the twenty-first century—we are at some distance away from a "post-neoliberal turn" that might have proposed economic reform anywhere near the levels of the national-populist revolutionary epoch of the mid-twentieth century. This leads us to the discussion of the MAS's economic policies disguised under a decolonizing, democratic revolution.

Fourthly, the "reconstituted neoliberalism" that Webber talks about seeks "success" within rather than against capitalism. Indeed, Webber points out that "the development model implemented by the Morales administration over the entire four years of his first administration (2006-2010) is best characterized as reconstituted neoliberalism" (2014, p. 177). Here again, as is also the case in

the three themes discussed above, we can perceive that, contrary to the belief that "Evismo" functions as a "specter" that embraces the programmatic cause of degrowth, the MAS's economic policies work as a "ghostly" reconstituted neoliberalism. Since the new developmental model is to embed the market in a coherent set of state-run modern institutions, the state takes control of the means of production and allocation in order for the market to perform smoothly. We are also talking here of neostructuralist economic policies that promote high growth and low spending. Growth based on high international prices of hydrocarbons and various ores. With tight fiscal policies and massive international reserves, the reconstituted neoliberalism, with sorely continuing social inequalities, has brought little change in the rates of poverty.

In the 1960s, famous Latin American economists, sociologists, and political scientists developed classic structuralism. Working alongside Raúl Prebisch, they indoctrinated Keynesian economics to middle-ranking Latin American bureaucrats in central banks, finance ministries and universities. While the structuralists did not develop the Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) growth model of the era, they did consolidate it throughout Latin America. US imperialism feared that this structuralist doctrine would accelerate state-owned enterprises, thus advocating more state planning within the economy. In reality, however, ISI allowed multinationals to leap tariff walls and build protected plants oriented toward growing international markets. Though a menace to US economic interests

at first, structuralism, when correctly contained, adapted well to American capitalism in the region.

Like structuralist economic policies in the 1960s, present-day neostructuralist policies in Latin America have moved to the center of political influence by challenging orthodox neoliberalism while also criticizing some tenets of classical structuralism. Reinforcing the strong presence of the state in key sectors of the economy, mainly hydrocarbons and minerals, neostructuralism extended into the first years development programs of left governments such as that of Evo Morales in Bolivia. Neostructuralist principles impacted the country's National Plan for Development 2006-2010, which predicated on the continuation of extractive capitalism, centered on exporting primary natural resource commodities mainly controlled by transnationals but with substantial revenue going to the state through royalties and taxation. Moderate reforms were introduced in the hydrocarbons sector, reforms that kept the new social-engineering approach of neostructuralism, which in turn maintained the basic foundations of neoliberalism in a context of a profound crisis of legitimacy as a development model in Latin America.

Bolivian neostructuralism revolves around "systemic competitiveness" and labor flexibility. Both features are diametrically opposed to the "spectral" degrowth predicted by hermeneutical communism. For neostructuralism, systemic competitiveness expresses the notion that markets and competition are the exclusive channels for social and economic interaction, and replaces the belief in compara-

tive advantages. This means that what competes in world markets are not the commodities, but complete social systems (Webber, p. 184). While accepting the markets as the central organizing force in society, neostructuralists prioritize the competitiveness of the whole system through effective state intervention in infrastructure (technology, energy, transport), education, finance, labor-management relations, in a way that orthodox neoliberal policies could not grasp.

In order to achieve systemic competitiveness in Bolivia, the whole idea of the state had to be reconfigured. Indeed, the state had to blend economic policy with political intervention in order to construct a broad social consensus. It also had to supplement the invisible hand of the market with non-market forms of social, political, and economic coordination, thus urging a large share of manufacture and value-added exports into the country's export profile. An important aspect of the state's role under this view was to build civil society-state partnerships to consolidate social, political, and ideological consensus across social classes behind the export-led capitalist growth.

The neostructuralists' center-left governments have only rhetorically expunged neoliberal policies. They have actually led to the politico-economic legitimation and consolidation of the capitalist restructuring initially set in motion by neoliberal ideas and policies. While neostructuralist ideologues around García Linera have labeled the process a *continuum* of national-populism, it actually promotes a certain nostalgia for the developmentalist era, and for that storied class, the national bourgeoisie. Neostruc-

turalist ideologues continue to mythologize the 1952 national Revolution and its aftermath, now complemented with disciplined *campesino-cocalero* and mining labor forces and with the business class hitching its wagons to the "Evista" plurinational project. As far as one can perceive the *realpolitik* of today's Bolivia, García Linera has become the spokesperson for economic moderation, while Evo Morales deploys a leftist and decolonizing rhetoric in tandem with the radical lineage of the party's revolutionary epoch. García Linera's line, however, represents the actual development plan that the MAS has structured and instituted since it was elected in 2005.

Fifthly, and lastly, capitalist development properly regulated by the state expunges conflict from its policy framework. This can be perceived in the state's attempt to construct consensus among workers regarding export-led capitalist development.

An important and practical innovation of García Linera's conceptualization of "Evismo" has been the notion of "labor flexibility"—that is, the state's attempt to construct a consensus among coca growers, mining cooperativists, and other social components of the working class to submit to the imperatives of export-led capitalist development. One of the important facets of this flexibility demands that labor movements should be co-opted and reengineered, abandoning the class struggle and conflict with the ruling class, and embracing cross-class cooperation and labor-state stability. Proof of this conflict-ridden labor policy is Bolivia's recently promulgated mining code, which im-

proves the sector's "systemic competitiveness" within the parameters of the existing capitalist order.

Given the economic and labor positioning of "Evismo" within a rigidly hierarchical and competitive world system governed by capitalism, it is difficult to speak of "degrowth" or to maintain that the policies of the Evo Morales government represent a post-neoliberal turn in the economic model of development, let alone a revolutionary process of socioeconomic transformation. If the country has grown at a fast rate as a consequence of primary minerals and hydrocarbon exports, the social effect of this growth has been neutralized by increases in the price of food. The buying power of the poorest sectors has declined and only 50-60% of those people who are employed can afford a basic food basket.

It has become increasingly clear that transnationals are demanding that the state continue its role as facilitator of the accumulation of capital and exploiter of the Bolivian workforce. The "specters" of communism, turned into ghosts of neoliberalism, lurk in the shadows of persistent class realities. Full-time unionized workers have actually grown weaker, and have lost their organizational class power, to the benefit of capital and the detriment of labor. As a consequence, the Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers Union, COB) is no longer an effective organizing body of the working class. Labor flexibility relies basically on dissuading workers from the class struggle, while at the same time demanding their submission to the model of export-led capitalist development. García Linera's neostruc-

turalism certainly agrees with orthodox neoliberalism on the necessity of labor flexibility, as well as the need to provide the labor force with new skills to help it adapt to the productive process.

In conclusion, if "Evismo" is living proof that "weak communism is not dead", then it must also produce facts to show that it is an alternative to capitalism and to framed democracies. As part of this "pink tide" of left-wing governments sweeping Latin America, the Morales government ought to be an economic process based on radical nationalization and natural resources, and a bastion against the exploitation of transnationals and in favor of control by native Indians.

The reality, however, could not be more different, so distant from this well-meaning desire to see the South American alternative modify existing socialisms in other regions of the world. As Jeffrey Webber's carefully documented analysis of "Evismo" demonstrates, over the years the Evo Morales government has turned from rebellion to reform. From 2005 on, the tendency of Morales's two terms was toward reconstituted neoliberalism. While abandoning features of neoliberal orthodoxy, the MAS government retained capitalism as the principal engine of growth. From an economic standpoint, both periods showed high rates of export-led growth—based on hydrocarbons and a mining boom—and low rates of spending. High levels of international reserves were accumulated, while social spending decreased as a proportion of GDP. Rates of poverty and levels of social inequality showed little change. Flexible la-

bor and a tight control of workers led the Morales government to suffocate any attempt to unionize independently. While keeping a strong anticapitalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric, Morales's economic policies moved endlessly to extract and industrialize.

Romanticized by the international left, the debates occurring inside the country are more richly grounded in the real contradictions of this social, political, and economic process. One thing, however, remains true of the "specters" of communism: the hope of Bolivia's emancipation still reflects how the *Katarista* indigenous movements of the early 1970s characterized reality as a necessary move to envision society "with both eyes", fighting against both capitalist exploitation and racial oppression, with visions of simultaneous indigenous liberation and socialist emancipation.

Bibliography

Hylton, Forrest and Thomson, Sinclair (2005). "The chequered rainbow". *New Left Review*, v. 2, n. 35, p. 42.

Stefanoni, Pablo (2010). "*Qué hacer con los indios...*" *Y otros traumas irresueltos de la colonialidad*. La Paz, Bolivia, Plural Editores.

Tórrez, Yuri and Arce C., Claudia (2014). *Construcción simbólica del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. Imagi-*

narios políticos, discursos, rituales y celebraciones. La Paz, Bolivia, Fundación PIEB.

Vattimo, Gianni and Zabala, Santiago (2011). *Hermeneutic communism. From Heidegger to Marx*. New York, Columbia University Press.

Webber, Jeffrey (2011). *From rebellion to reform in Bolivia. Class struggle, indigenous liberation, and the politics of Evo Morales.* Chicago, IL, Haymarket Books.